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THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Arbitration-NAFTA-jurisdiction-waiver of right to initiate or continue other legal proceedings-
effect of pursuing municipal law claims in municipal court
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. V. MEXICO. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2. 15 ICSID REV.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT LJ. 214 (2000), obtainable from <http://wvw.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/awards.htm>.
NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal, June 2, 2000.
On September 29, 1998, Waste Management, Inc., submitted a claim to arbitration in
connection with a concession agreement between its subsidiary, Acaverde S.A. de C.V. (Aca-
verde), and the City Council of Acapulco. Waste Management alleged that Mexico had
breached the provisions of Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement'
(NAFTA) regarding expropriation and minimum standard of treatment. Along with its claim,
Waste Management submitted a waiver of rights to initiate or continue other legal proceed-
ings, which is required by NAFTA Article 1121. Waste Management expressed its under-
standing that the waiver did not apply to claims under Mexico's municipal law. After the
waiver was filed, Acaverde continued to prosecute two suits against a state-owned bank and
initiated an arbitral proceeding against the City Council of Acapulco for breaches of
contract under Mexican law. The Arbitral Tribunal (Tribunal) held that Chapter 11 requires
a claimant to waive other legal proceedings challenging any measure alleged to violate
NAFTA, and that although Waste Management's waiver was formally sufficient, Acaverde's
subsequent conduct rendered the waiver invalid. The Tribunal concluded that it therefore
lackedjurisdiction.2
The concession agreement between Acaverde and the City Council of Acapulco was
guaranteed by a state-owned bank, Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Pdiblicos (Banobras).
When Acapulco and Banobras failed to pay invoices for services under the agreement,
Acaverde brought two suits against Banobras in Mexican courtfor breach of contract.
3 Waste
Management was evidently reluctant to give up these domestic remedies when it filed its
Chapter 11 claim. The first waiver it submitted to the secretary-general of the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) onJuly 22, 1998, stated explicitly
that "[t]his waiver does not apply ... to any dispute settlement proceedings involving
allegations that Respondent has violated duties imposed by other sources of law, including
the municipal law of Mexico."4 After some correspondence with ICSID, Waste Management
sent a second waiver with the submission of its claim to arbitration on September 29, 1998.'
This waiver stated:
Without derogating from the waiver required by NAFrAArticle 1121, Claimants here set
forth their understanding that the above waiver does not apply to any dispute settlement
proceedings involving allegations that Respondent has violated duties imposed by sources
of law other than Chapter Eleven of NAFrA, including the municipal laws of Mexico.
6
'North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, reprinted in 32 IIM 605,
639-49 (1993) [hereinafter NAFIA].
2 SeeWaste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, Award (NAFrACh. 11 Arb. Trib.,June 2,2000), 15 IcSID REV. FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LJ. 214,239 (2000) [hereinafter Award], obtainable from <http://wwv.wordbank.org/icsid/cases/
awards.htm>. Bernardo M. Cremades (president) and Eduardo Siqueiros T. constituted the majority. The late
Keith Highet dissented. The online version of the Award, including the dissenting opinion, id. at 241-270 [here-
inafter Highet dissent], has the same pagination as the version at 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT LJ. 214.
3SeeAward, supra note 2, at 232-33. The two suits were filed on January 31, 1997, and August 11, 1998. See id.
4 Id. at 219. This waiver was sent with Waste Management's notice of intent to submit a claim, which NAFrA
Article 1119 requires a claimant to file at least 90 days prior to submitting a claim to arbitration. Waste Manage-
ment was not required to file a waiver, however, until its claim was actually submitted to arbitration. See NAFrA,
supranote 1,Art. 1121(3), 32 ILM at 643.
' SeeAward, supra note 2, at 219-21. In section 5, the Award mistakenly refers to the claim as having been
submitted in 1999 rather than 1998.
6 Id. at 221.
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Acaverde continued to prosecute its two suits against Banobras and, on October 27, 1998,
also initiated an arbitration against the City Council of Acapulco before the City of Mexico
Chamber of Commerce Permanent Arbitration Committee claiming damages for non-
payment of the invoices under Mexican law.
7
The Tribunal began its analysis by reading Article 1121 to require a waiver strictly in
accordance with its terms.' The Tribunal reasoned that its jurisdiction depended on the
consent of the parties to arbitration and that, because Mexico had consented under Article
1122 "to arbitration in accordance with the procedures set out in this Agreement,"9 fulfill-
mentofArticle 1121's conditions precedentfor arbitration required "the utmost attention.""
"[A] ny waiver must be clear, explicit and categorical, it being improper to deduce same
from expressions the meaning of which is at all dubious."" Article 1121 (3) provides that the
"consent and waiver required by this Article shall be in writing, shall be delivered to the
disputing Party and shall be included in the submission of a claim to arbitration."12 The
Tribunal characterized these formal requirements as ad substantiam, so that a waiver that
failed to comply with them would "not exist as such."13 The Tribunal concluded, however, that
Waste Management's waiverwas free from such formal defects and rejected Mexico's attempt
to add an additional requirement of notarization to those set forth in Article 1121 (3).14
The Tribunal also rejected Mexico's argument that the Tribunal was obliged "to ensure that
the disputing investors will make their waiver effective before every tribunal or in anyjudi-
cial or administrative proceeding," noting that the Tribunal "lacks the necessary authority
to bar the Claimant from initiating other proceedings in fora other than the present one."15
Critically, however, the Tribunal was willing to review Waste Management's postwaiver
conduct. The Tribunal reasoned that
the act of waiver involves a declaration of intent by the issuing party, which logically
entails a certain conduct in line with the statement issued.
... Hence, in order for said intent to assume legal significance, it is not suffic [ient]
for it to exist internally. Instead, it must be voiced or made manifest, in the case in point
by means of a written text and specific conduct on the part of the waiving party in line
with the declaration made.
1 6
7 See id. at 232-33. Acaverde's suits against Banobras were dismissed in January 1999, and its appeals were
unsuccessful. Acaverde abandoned its arbitration against Acapulco onJuly 7,1999. Id
'NAFTAArticIe 1121 (1), entitled "Conditions Precedent to Submission ofa Claim to Arbitration," provides in
relevant part:
A disputing investor may submit a claim under Article 1116 to arbitration only if... (b) the investor and,
where the claim is for loss or damage to an interest in an enterprise ofanother Party thatis ajuridical person
that the investor owns or controls directly or indirectly, the enterprise, waive their right to initiate or continue
before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement
procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputingParty thatis alleged to be a breach
referred to in Article 1116, except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief,
not involving the payment of damages, before an administrative tribunal or court under the law of the
disputing Party.
Article 1121(2) requires the same waiver for claims underArticle 1117 on behalf of an enterprise that the investor
owns or controls.
9 NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 1122(1), 32 ILM at 644.
" Award, supra note 2, at 228; see id. at 227-28. The Arbitral Tribunal (Tribunal) also noted that Article 1121
provides for the submission of a claim "only if" the proper waiver is filed. See id. at 227.
" Id. at 229.
12 NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 1121 (3), 32 ILM at 643.
" Award, supra note 2, at 230; see id. at 230-31. Consistent with this position, the Tribunal also concluded that
"submission of the waiver must take place in conjunction with" the submission of the claim to arbitration. Id. at 229.
" See id. at 231. This argument suggests that the reason Mexico did not use the waiver to seek dismissal ofAcaverde's
two suits against Banobras was that the waiver, absent the requisite formalities, would not have been deemed
sufficient in a Mexican court.
" Id. at 227.
16 Id. at 231-32.
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The Tribunal readArticle 1121 to require Waste Management andAcaverde not simply to avoid
invoking NAFTA in other fora, but to forgo domestic law claims based on the same measures."
[T]he domestic proceedings initiated by ACAVERDE fall within the prohibition of
NAFTA Art. 1121 in that they refer to measures that are also invoked in the present
arbitral proceedings as breaches of NAFTA provisions, namely non-compliance with the
obligations of guarantor assumed under a line of credit agreement requiring BANOBRAS
to defray invoices not paid by ACAPULCO city council, and non-compliance by ACAPULCO
city council through its failure to pay said invoices. 8
The Tribunal concluded that it could not "deem as valid the waiver tendered by the Claim-
ant in its submission of the claim to arbitration, in view of its having been drawn up with
additional interpretations, which have failed to translate as the effective abdication of rights
mandated by the waiver," and dismissed the claim for lack ofjurisdiction."9
In dissent, the late Keith Highet disagreed with the Tribunal's understanding of the word
"measure" in Article 1121. While he acknowledged that NAFTA's definition of "measure" is
broad,2" he argued that Article 1121 uses that word in a more limited sense.
The reference in Article 1121 is to a State act that is itself a breach of international
obligations under NAFTA. Article 1121 cannot be read as applying to local components
of such an act which are not themselves breaches of international obligations at the
international treaty level and which would not be actionable under NAFTA."
In Highet's view, the purpose of Article 1121 was not to bar local remedies for related
commercial claims, but to protect the NAFTA parties from "parallel actions in their own
judicial systems that would raise NAFTA claims."2 He read Article 1121 as providing "the
same kind of protection" as Annex 1120.1, which bars investors from alleging a breach of
Chapter 11 both in arbitration and before a Mexican court.23 Highet also noted that "it
would be an extreme price to pay in order to engage in NAFTA arbitration for a NAFTA
claimant to be forced to abandon all local remedies relating to commercial law recoveries
that could have some bearing on its NAFTA claim."'4 Because nonpayment of invoices is not
itself a violation of Chapter 11,25 he reasoned that Waste Management and Acaverde were
not required to forgo alternative remedies under Mexican law for such nonpayment.
Highet's position on the appropriateness of a Chapter 11 tribunal reviewing the claimant's
postwaiver conduct is not entirely clear. At one point in his dissent, he seemed to agree with
the majority, stating that " [i]f the Article 1121 waiver had been intended to cover any and all
concurrent legal activity, then clearly Claimant's course of conduct in Mexico would be in-
consistent with it and would vitiate the waiver."'6 Later, however, he criticized the majority for
17 See id. at 233-38. The Tribunal assumed that the purpose ofrequiringsuch awaiverwas to avoid the possibility
that a claimant might recover twice for the same damages-once in a domestic forum and once before a Chapter
11 tribunal. See id. at 235-36.
18 Id. at 236.
19 Id. at 239.
210 See Highet dissent, supra note 2, at 245-46; NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 201, 32 ILM at 298 ("measure includes
any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice").
21 Highet dissent, supra note 2, at 246. In support of his narrow reading of Article 1121, Highet also observed
that it requires awaiver not of all proceedings that somehow related to the measure alleged to breach NAFMA, but
only of proceedings "with respect to" such a measure. "[A]s a legal matter, this means that the proceeding must
primarily concern, or be addressed to, that measure." Id. at 252.
2 Id. at 260.
2 3
1 Id. at 258. SeeNAFrA, supra note 1, Annex 1120.1, 32 ILM at 648 ("an investor of another Party may not allege
that Mexico has breached an obligation under [NAFrA] both in an arbitration under this Section and in proceed-
ings before a Mexican court or administrative tribunal").
214 Highet dissent, supra note 2, at 260.
2 See id. at 247.26 Id. at 253.
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"read [ing] into the text of Article 1121 the additional requirement that litigations subject to
the waiver be affirmatively withdrawn."27 He noted that "[i] t is hard to find fault" with Waste
Management's argument "that, once the waiver had been prepared and delivered ... , it was
up to Respondent to use it as it saw fit."28 In the end, relying on the award on jurisdiction
in Ethyl Corporation v. Canada,29 Highet took the position that a claimant's postwaiver con-
duct should be reviewed by a Chapter 11 tribunal, but as a matter of admissibility rather
than jurisdiction." The proper remedy for conduct inconsistent with the waiver, he sug-
gested, would be to disallow that portion of the claim that had also been raised in the do-
mestic proceedings, not to dismiss the entire claim for want ofjurisdiction.3'
This case raises two specific questions concerning the proper relationship between na-
tional courts and Chapter 11 arbitration. 2 First, as a precondition to bringing a claim before
a Chapter 11 tribunal, is an investor required to waive its right to alternative legal pro-
ceedings only with respect to its NAFTA claims or also with respect to claims for damages33
under domestic law? Second, who should monitor the claimant's postwaiver conduct the
Chapter 11 tribunal or national courts?
On the first question, the Tribunal is clearly correct in concluding thatArticle 1121 requires
a waiver of the right to seek damages in other fora for violations of both NAFTA and domes-
tic law. The text of Article 1121 focuses not on whether the legal basis for the proceedings
under NAFTA and domestic law is the same, but on whether the same measure is being
challenged. It requires an investor to waive its "right to initiate or continue before any admin-
istrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement proce-
dures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to be
a breach [of NAFrA]." Furthermore, Highet's interpretation of Article 1121 as requiring
a waiver only of claims based on NAFTA would make the waiver requirement redundant. As
the dissent itself acknowledges, Annex 1120.1 already protects Mexico against an investor
claiming violations of NAFTA both in domestic courts and before a Chapter 11 tribunal.3
Canada and the United States enjoy similar protection because their implementing legis-
lation effectively prohibits private parties from raising NAFTA violations in their courts at
all. 6 It is also worth noting that the Tribunal's interpretation of Article 1121 does not
2
1 Id. at 256.
2 Id. Highet also faulted the Tribunal for looking to Waste Management's postwaiver litigation to eviscerate the
waiver while ignoring its subsequent abandonment of those suits. See id. at 263 ("[E]ven if the substance of the
Article 1121 waiverhad been-as the majorityof the Tribunal believes-eviscerated in 1998 or 1999, whywas that
substance not restored ... later in 1999 or inJanuary 2000?"). Acaverde abandoned its litigation against Banobras,
however, only after exhausting its appeals. See Award, supra note 2, at 233. Acaverde did abandon the domestic
arbitration against the City Council of Acapulco inJuly 1999, see id., although the arbitral tribunal never formally
declared the proceeding closed, see id. at 238.
" Ethyl Corp. v. CanadaJurisdiction, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.,June 24,1999), reprinted in 38 ILM 708
(1999) [hereinafter Ethyl arbitration]; seeAlan C. Swan, Case Report: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, 94 AJEL 159
(2000).
s See Highet dissent, supra note 2, at 264-68.
s' See id. at 267.
2For a discussion of other questions concerning this relationship, see William S. Dodge, National Courts and
International Arbitration: Exhaustion of Remedies and ResJudicata Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 357 (2000).
3 Article 1121 expressly permits a claimant to seek damages from a Chapter 11 tribunal and simultaneously or
subsequently to seek declaratory or injunctive relief in domestic court-relief that Chapter 11 tribunals are not
capable of granting. See NAFrA, supra note 1, Art. 1135, 32 ILM at 646.
m Id., Art. 1121 (1), (2), 32 ILM at 643 (emphasis added).
32 See Highet dissent, supra note 2, at 258.
s SeeNorth American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §3312 (c) (2) (1994) ("No person
other than the United States ... may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or
inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political
20011
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require that an investor, contrary to what Highet suggests,3 7 completely abandon its local
remedies in order to pursue a Chapter 11 claim. An investor is free to pursue local remedies
for up to three years before it submits a claim to NAFTA arbitration.
-8
The Tribunal's conclusion that it ought to monitor the claimant's postwaiver conduct is
more questionable. The text ofArticle 1121 simply requires thatawaiver "shall be in writing,
shall be delivered to the disputing Party and shall be included in the submission of a claim
to arbitration."3 9 As Highet observed, it is hard to find fault with Waste Management's posi-
tion that it was up to Mexico to raise the waiver as a defense in the other proceedings.
4
0
Moreover, the Tribunal's decision to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction may have little practical
effect. Waste Management was free to refile its Chapter 11 claim within three years of the
breach and resulting loss, 41 and it did so on September 27, 2000.'
By grafting onto Article 1121 a requirement that a claimant affirmatively discontinue other
legal proceedings, the Tribunal seems to have departed from its position that a Chapter 11
tribunal must adhere strictly to NAFTA's text. This inconsistency, however, is ultimately less
troubling than the inconsistency between Waste Management and other Chapter 11 awards,
specifically those in Ethyl Corp. v. Canada43 and Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada.44 Where the
Tribunal in Waste Managemnt stressed that compliance with Article 1121 required "the
utmost attention"45 and that a waiver that did not meet the formal requirements of Article
1121 (3) would "not exist as such,"46 the Ethyl tribunal expressly rejected any notion that
Chapter 11's procedural requirements should be interpreted "strictly."4 7 Where Waste
Management held that "submission of the waiver must take place in conjunction with" the
submission of the claim to arbitration," both Ethyl and Pope & Talbot allowed claimants to
submit waivers later.49 Where Waste Management said that "any waiver must be clear, explicit
and categorical, it being improper to deduce same from expressions the meaning of which
subdivision of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with [NAFTA] ... ."); North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, R.S.C., ch. 44, §6(2) (1993) (Can.) ("Subject to Section
B of Chapter Eleven of the Agreement, no person has any cause of action and no proceeding of any kind shall be
taken, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, to enforce or determine any right or obligation
that is claimed or arises solely under or by virtue of the Agreement.").
57 See Highet dissent, supra note 2, at 260.
ss Indeed, I have argued that Article 1121 is structured to encourage investors to pursue local remedies before
resorting to Chapter 11. SeeDodge, supranote 32, at381-83. Of course, an investorwho does pursue its domestic
remedies before turning to Chapter 11 runs the risk that the Chapter 11 tribunal will treat the domestic decision
as resjudicata. See, e.g., Azinian v. Mexico, Merits, Award (NAFrA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib., Nov. 1, 1999), reprinted in 39
ILM 537 (2000), obtainabkefrom<http://wwvwqworidbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm>. For further discussion of
resjudicata in the context of Chapter 11, see Dodge, supra note 32, at 376-83.
55NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 1121 (3), 32 ILM at 643.
0 See supra note 28 and accompanying text
41 SeeNAFTA, supra note 1, Arts. 1116(2), 1117(2).
42 U.S. Waste ControlFirm Refiles Case Under NAFTA InvestorState Provisions, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. 1528 (Oct 5, 2000).
Ethyl arbitration, supra note 29.
"Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award in Relation to Preliminary Motion by Government of Canada to Strike
Paragraphs 34 and 103 of the Statement of Claim from the Record (the "Harmac Motion"] (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib., Feb. 24, 2000), 23 HASTINGSINT'L& COMP.L.REV. 447(2000) [hereinafterPope &TalbotHarnac motion].
As of this writing, there has not been a final award in the Pope & Talbot case. There has been a series of interim
awards, however, dealing with such issues as the scope of Chapter 11, the waiver requirement, performance
requirements, expropriation, and the submission of new claims. Four of these awards (including the award on the
Harmac motion) are reprinted in 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. at 431-93. The final award will be reported
in a subsequent issue of the Journal.
45 Award, supra note 2, at 228.
46 1& at 230.
4 Ethyl arbitration, supra note 29, 38 ILM at 723.
48 Award, supra note 2, at 229.
41 See Ethyl arbitration, supra note 29, 38 ILM at 729 (allowing waiver to be submitted with statement of claim
filed nearly six months after submission of the claim to arbitration); Pope & Talbot Harmac motion, supra note
44, at 452 (allowing waiver submitted nearly two years after the submission of a claim to have "retroactive effect").
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is at all dubious,"50 Ethyl suggested and Pope & Talbot held that the necessary waiver could
be implied from the act of submitting a claim to arbitration under Chapter Ii. And where
the Ethyltribunal was apparently persuaded to read Chapter II's procedural requirements
flexibly to avoid the inefficiency of requiring the claimant to refile,52 the Tribunal in Waste
Management either ignored this possibility or thought it irrelevant. 3
As a formal matter, the Tribunal in Waste Management was not bound to follow the awards
in Ethyl and Pope & Talbot. NAFrA Article 1136 provides that "[a]n award made by a Tri-
bunal shall have no bindingforce exceptbetween the disputing parties and in respect of the
particular case." 4 Nevertheless, these conflicting positions leave future Chapter 11 parties
without adequate guidance and may discourage resort to a dispute resolution process that
provides such inconsistent results.5
The continuing problem is to provide a system of control for, and possibly a means of appeal
from, Chapter 11 arbitrations." Chapter 11 provides a limited system of control by giving
NAFMA countries the authority under Article 1131 (2) to issue binding interpretations of its
text.57 Canada, Mexico, and the United States ought to use this power to resolve differences
in interpretation by different tribunals, thus providing guidance and predictabilityfor future
cases. But Chapter 11 does not provide any system of appeal to correct errors in individual
cases, in sharp contrast with GAT 1994, which established an Appellate Body to review the
legal determinations of individual WTO panels. The Chapter 11 negotiators seem to have
assumed that Chapter 11 claims (at least against Canada and the United States) would be
relatively infrequent and would not often challenge important national policies, so that
appellate review would be an unnecessary and costly burden. Both of these assumptions,
however, have proven to be incorrect. Each of the NAFTA parties has seen a number of
claims filed against it-many of them challenging important policies rangingfrom environ-
Award, supra note 2, at 229.
5, See Ethyl arbitration, supra note 29, 38 ILM at 729 (Article 1121 "seem [s] designed to memorialize expressis
verbis what is normally the case in any event, namely, that the initiation of arbitration constitutes consent to
arbitration by the initiator, whereby access to any court or other dispute settlement mechanism is precluded");
Pope & Talbot Harmac motion, supra note 44, at 451 ("the initiation of arbitral proceedings may be taken as a
constructive waiver of the right to initiate other proceedings").
2 SeeEthyl arbitration, supra note 29, 38 1LM at 728-29 ("It is not doubted that today Claimant could resubmit
the very claim advanced here .... Clearly a dismissal of the claim at thisjuncture would disserve, rather than serve,
the object and purpose of NAMr.").
513 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
rNAFrA, supra note 1, Art. 1136, 32 ILM at 646. The provision seems to be drawn from Article 59 of the Statute
of the International Court ofJustice, which is based on Article 59 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
InternationalJustice. The Permanent Court interpreted Article 59 to reject a system of binding precedent. See
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 7, at 19 (May 25) ("The
object of [Article 59] is simply to prevent legal principles accepted by the Court in a particular case from being
binding on other States in other disputes.").
" Cf. Highet dissent, supranote 2, at 241 (noting that"the Award will bean important guidance to future poten-
tial NAFTA claimants").
Sb See V. IicHAELREISMAN, SYSTEMSOFCONTROLININTERNATIONALADJUDICATIONANDARBITRATION 8-9 (1992)
(distinguishing between control and appeal).
'7 See NAFMA, supra note 1, Art. 1131 (2), 32 ILM at 645. Another system of control exists in the provisions for
review bya court in the country where the award was rendered in a proceeding for annulment, seeid. Art. 1136(3),
32 ILM at 646, and by a court in the country where enforcement is sought under the Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwards (NewYork Convention),June 10,1958, 330 UNTS 38, or Inter-
American Convention on International CommercialArbitration (Inter-American Convention),Jan. 30,1975,14 ILM
336 (1975). See NAFrA, supra note 1, Art. 1136(6), 32 ILM at 646. For discussion of the New York Cdnvention as
a system of control, see REISMAN, supra note 56, at 109-20.
Even where an important domestic law or practice is found to violate NAFTA, a state should have no right to
resist enforcement of a Chapter 11 award on public policy grounds under Article 5(2) (b) of the New York
Convention or Article 5 (2) (b) of the Inter-American Convention. The NAFrA parties have agreed to subject their
domestic law to the disciplines of Chapter 11, which should preclude the parties from complaining that an award
applying those constraints contravenes their public policy.
2001]
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mental regulation 8 to the awarding of punitive damages."9 If these trends continue, Canada,
Mexico, and the United States might be well advised to consider amending Chapter 11 to
provide for a system of appellate review.
WILLIAM S. DODGE
Hastings College of the Law
University of California
Sovereign immunity from suit-agreement between a local-government entity and aforeign state-distinc-
tion between public and private acts-waiver of immunity----ect of choice-of-law clause on immunity
LOCALAUTHORITYOFVASTERAS V. REPUBLIC OF ICELAND. Case No. 1999:112, NyttJuridiskt
Arkiv, Avd. I, Rttsfall fr-n H6gsta Domstolen (New Legal Archives, Part I, Cases Decided
by the Supreme Court).
H6gsta Domstolen (Supreme Court of Sweden), December 30, 1999.
Swedish courts, and particularly the Supreme Court (Higsta Domstolen), seldom find the
opportunity to opine on the issue of a foreign state's immunity from suit.' One such uncom-
mon occasion arose in December 1999 when the Supreme Court, on grounds of immunity
from suit, affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by the Local Authority of Visteris
(Local Authority)-one of Sweden's 289 town districts-against the Republic of Iceland for
monies due under a contract.
The origin of the dispute is a contract (Contract) dated December 1, 1992, between the
Icelandic Ministry of Education and Culture (Icelandic Ministry) and the Local Authority,
which is responsible for schools in the Swedish town district of Vfster'.s.
2 According to
Article 3 of the Contract, the Local Authority undertakes to give flight-technician education
to Icelandic students and to examine them at the end of their studies. The Icelandic Ministry
agrees, according to the same article, to "defray any possible costs of educating Icelandic
students that are not covered by the Swedish government according to the Agreement
between the Nordic countries concerning education at the upper-secondary-school level."
Article 7 of the Contract provides that disputes concerning the implementation of the
Contract will be settled according to Swedish law.
The agreement referred to in the Contract is the Agreement on a Nordic Common Edu-
cation at the Upper Secondary School Level (1992 Agreement),' which had been signed by
'See, e.g., Ethyl arbitration, supra note 29,38 ILM at 711 (noting Ethyl's claim that Canada's MMT Act violated
Chapter 11 provisions on national treatment, performance requirements, and expropriation); Metalclad Corp.
v. Mexico, Merits,Award (NAFrACh. 11 Arb. Trib., Aug. 30,2000) <http://www.pearceIaw.com/metalclad.html>
(holding that denial of claimant's right to operate a landfill on environmental grounds was a denial offair and
equitable treatment and an expropriation); Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim (July 2, 1999), Methanex Corp.
v. United States (NAFrA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.) <http://ww.methanexmcom/investorcentre/mtbe/noticeofmtenLtpdf>
(alleging that California's decision to ban the gasoline additive MTBE is an expropriation and a denial of fair and
equitable treatment). The Metalkad award will be reported in a subsequent issue of the JournaL
9 SeeNotice of Claim (Oct. 30,1998), Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (NAFrA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.) (on file with
author) (claiming that punitive damagesjudgment constitutes inter alia an expropriation and a denial ofjustice).
'The total number of Supreme Court cases having any connection to state immunity is not more than ten. Half
of these cases belong to the period before World War II.
' This contract (on file with author) is a revised version of a contract on the same subject concluded in May
1991. It is written in Swedish. Translations of the contract and of all other Swedish documents cited in this case
report are by the author. This report uses contractfor the Swedish word avta4 and agreementfor the Swedish word
averenskommelse. Both Swedish terms can, in principle, be used broadly to describe any sort ofagreement. Although
it is rather common to use 6verenskomnese for agreements between states, avtal is also used for international
agreements, particularly those that have a rather limited subject matter. Avtal is almost always used to describe
commercial contracts. The implications of these different words were not at issue in the case, and the use of
contract in this report is not intended to resolve the underlying issue regarding the nature of the instrument.
3 SVERIGES INTERNATIONELLA 0VERENSKOMELSER [hereinafter S6] 1993:8. S6 is the official collection of
Sweden's international agreements.
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